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Resumo Um grande esforço de pesquisa tem sido feito para avaliar os 
determinantes dos spreads bancários. Neste estudo utilizam-se os 
dados da pesquisa do Banco Mundal Doing Business para avaliar em 
que medida a assimetria informacional influencia o nível de spread 
bancário. Os resultados encontrados neste trabalho sugerem que os 
spreads sofrem influencia do nível de assimetria informacional. Nas 
taxas de baixo risco (prime rates) um grau pequeno de assimetria 
informacional pode reduzir de 2 a 4% o nível do spread. Conjectura-se 
que maiores reduções podem ser obtidas para dívidas de maior risco. 
A metodologia econométrica utilizada consiste em técnicas de painel 
estático. Para confirmar ou refutar os resultados deste trabalho 
estudos com amostra maiores devem ser feitas assim que novas 
informações sobre a pesquisa Doing Business estejam disponibilizadas. 
Palavras-chave: setor bancário, assimetria informacional, taxa de juros. 
  
Abstract A large effort in research was made in order to assess which are the 
determining factors in bank spreads. Employing information 
asymmetry indicators based on the World Bank’s Doing Business 
survey, we aim to investigate the role that information asymmetry 
plays in bank spreads. The results found in this paper suggest that the 
existence of a lesser degree of information asymmetry in credit 
markets reduces bank spreads. This conclusion was obtained based on 
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a study of prime loan rates. The effect would be between a 2% to 4% 
permanent reduction in spreads. It is argued that larger reductions 
could be obtained for other kinds of greater risk credit. The relation 
was obtained based on econometric panel data models with static 
effects and seems to be solid from the statistical viewpoint. 
Nonetheless, new studies involving larger samples should be 
performed in order to confirm this relationship. 
Keywords: banking sector, informational asymmetry, interest rates. 
  
Resumen Uno gran esfuerzo en pesquisa tiene sido hecho para conocer los 
factores determinantes del spread bancario. Indicadores de asimetría 
de información basados en los dados de Doing Business del World 
Bank son empleados para investigar el papel de la asimetría de 
información en spread bancario. Los resultados sugieren que la 
existencia de un bajo nivel de asimetría de información en los 
mercados de crédito reduce spreads bancarios. La conclusión es 
basada en un estudio de tasas de bajo riesgo que reducen 
permanentemente el spread entre 2% y 4%. Mayores reducciones 
podrían ser obtenidas para otras tasas de riesgo. La relación fue 
obtenida con base en un modelo econométrico con dados painel y 
efectos estáticos, presentando características sólidas por la óptica 
estadística. Nuevas pesquisas con muestras mayores deberían ser 
hechas para confirmar esa relación. 
Palabras-clave: sector bancario, asimetría de información, tasa de interés. 
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Introduction 
There is an ample research on the determining factors in bank spreads. Studies 
focused on determining factors in the level of credit supplied in the market, as 
well as analyses to break down bank spreads into a number of components have 
been frequent, and a series of variables have been found to explain and assist in 
better understanding their behavior. 
Information asymmetry among lenders and borrowers in connection with project 
quality, the behavior by borrowers and the risk of default, create impacts on the 
cost of funds to borrowers. While there is an extensive theoretical literature on 
the role played by information in credit markets, little attention has been paid to 
the institutional answers to reduce this asymmetry’s impact (Galindo 2001). 
This paper aims to evaluate if the differences in spreads observed among 
countries may be explained by the greater or lesser degree of information credit 
sharing. What is the role that information asymmetry plays to explain bank 
spreads difference among countries? 
The paper is divided in the following parts. This introduction is followed by a 
review of the literature on information asymmetry, its role in credit markets and 
the key studies on this topic. In a third section there is a description of the 
econometric methodology employed and the survey’s key results are presented. 
Finally, the key conclusions are drawn. 
 
Literature review 
Information asymmetry 
In the field of microeconomic theory, a line of research investigates the role that 
information asymmetry plays in the dynamics of a number of markets. The basic 
concept of asymmetric and imperfect information as employed in this paper is 
that in some markets purchasers and sellers or service providers are unable to 
gain access to the same information, either owing to the high cost involved in 
obtaining it or because it is totally impossible to confirm a participant’s degree of 
wiliness to repay. The consequences of this fact vary between an incorrect 
definition of the price of market transactions owing to the high risk by one of the 
parties (moral hazard) and the latter’s complete lack of feasibility (adverse 
selection process) (Akerlof 1970, Varian 2000, Eaton 1999). 
A number of markets can be used in order to provide examples of the concepts 
involved here. Akerlof (1970) begins his study with the automobile market, 
selected more because of its tangible nature and ease of understanding than 
because of its importance or realism. In this example information asymmetry is 
developed as of the moment in which a car owner is acquainted with all qualities 
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of the car put up for sale, while all likely buyers are not. In this case it would not 
be possible for buyers to detect whether it is a quality automobile or a lemon. As 
a result, in this market buyers will usually pay average prices based on the 
perception of the percentage of good and bad cars in the market (and not really 
on quality as this is a latent characteristic). When a person decides to try and sell 
a bad car, this affects the perception of buyers on the average quality of cars in 
the market, with the resulting decrease in the price of such goods. 
This external feature drives off the sellers of good cars (who expect to receive a 
fair price for their goods), causing a fault in the market, also known as adverse 
selection (Varian 2000:718). When this condition takes place consecutively, at 
most it creates the concept of a lemons market in which good quality goods are 
forced out of the market and only the poor quality items will remain. 
Another example mentioned in literature refers to the insurance market. The 
same information asymmetry and adverse selection reasoning may apply, now in 
the opposite sense, with the increase in the price for the goods and services. 
According to Eaton (1999:162), should the insurance companies be able to detect 
the risk features of each one of their insured customers, in a perfect balance, 
then they would be able to provide infinite types of insurance in the market, each 
one with a price adequate to each customer, under a situation of complete 
information. 
However, owing to the existence of latent characteristics arising from the 
prohibitive costs in obtaining this information, price is determined by the relative 
dimensions of each group, whereby an average price is found. In this case the 
low-risk insured parties will subsidize the insurance policies for high-risk 
individuals. An adverse selection takes place inasmuch as the proportion of high-
risk purchasers of insurance increases, by increasing excessively the cost (and 
the subsidy) for low-risk purchasers, who will consequently be removed from the 
market. 
Another paradox discussed in micro-economic theory is the moral hazard 
problem. The concepts previously described were related to the latent 
characteristics of the quality of the goods and services or of the parties to which 
services are provided. According to Eaton (1999:167), the moral hazard problem 
is one more class arising from situations with asymmetrical information, with 
regard to latent actions. 
Varian (2000:722) suggests that if the individuals have something completely 
insured, they would tend not to be so careful as they would not have to account 
for the cost of their actions. As a result, their incentive to take care of an insured 
object would be reduced. When compared to standard market behavior, which 
assumes that the amount of goods traded in a competitive market is determined 
by the condition under which demand is equal to supply, a paradox appears. With 
the existence of moral hazard, such as in this case involving the insurance 
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market, consumers would like more and more to purchase additional insurance, 
insurance companies would be willing to sell more insurance if they could count 
with customer willingness to be more careful, but the latter would rationally 
choose to be less careful. 
Once more it is pointed out by this author that markets with a moral hazard may 
tend to disappear in the adverse selection process. It is also contended that 
markets in which some of the parties are unable to detect any features or 
actions, in a balanced situation they may act with some form of rationing. In the 
case of the credit market, even those companies wishing to supply more credit 
than they do, would not be willing to do so owing to the change in customer 
incentives to act adequately. 
In the light of the risk of reducing business arising from information asymmetry 
and the resulting negative impact, a number of mechanisms are naturally 
created by market participants in order to reduce the effects of quality 
uncertainty. The individuals penalized are encouraged to find a way out of the 
dilemma imposed by the latent features, a reaction known as signaling (Eaton 
1999:164). 
Another process emphasized by this author to minimize the impacts of 
asymmetry in information is the sorting process made by companies, which 
should be performed as far as possible. Insurance companies seek to qualify their 
customers as much as possible with the creation of as many profiles as possible, 
using their certificates to adapt them to each risk group. Companies in an 
admission process employ formal (experience, titles) or informal (references) 
certificates to select their employees. In conclusion, potential purchasers may 
rate goods according to the guarantees provided. 
 
Information asymmetry in the credit market 
Information asymmetry is especially important when assessing the credit market. 
Several authors have related this condition to adverse selection situations in the 
market, resulting in problems between likely lenders and borrowers and including 
situations of credit rationing, impacts on competitiveness and market structure. 
In summary, these authors emphasize that information asymmetry plays an 
important role in the credit market’s dynamics. Furthermore, the authors point 
out the number of actions by credit market participants in minimizing the impacts 
of information asymmetry. 
Initially, the credit market’s activities should be defined, in particular the credit 
granting process and the resulting specification of interest rates. According to 
Pinheiro and Moura (2001), a credit decision varies in accordance with the nature 
of bank and borrower. Credit applications are handled automatically through 
statistical methods, based on information supplied by customers and information 
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available in credit agencies. Bearing in mind each borrower’s nature, a score is 
attributed which serves to define each customer’s credit limit or a maximum loan 
amount, and the appropriate interest rate for that customer. 
The moment when information asymmetry in the credit market becomes more 
apparent and its effects more important, are in those situations in which banks 
are less aware then their borrowers of the risks assumed in financing a project (or 
of their real payment ability, in the case of individuals). In these cases 
competitive balance may be inefficient. 
Leland and Pyle (1977), in accordance with the work of Akerlof (1970), suggests 
that information asymmetry in the financial market is particularly pronounced. 
According to the authors, borrowers have information on their wiliness to repay, 
on their already pledged collateral, or further, companies are aware of their skills 
in industry and of internal information on their projects. 
However, on the other hand all this information is difficult to access by lenders. 
This results in a moral hazard process in which the natural exaggeration of 
positive qualities, whether of individuals or of the projects defended by 
companies in search of loans, prevents the existence of a direct transfer of 
information with quality among market participants. The authors go on to 
contend that without a transfer of information, a process which reduces 
asymmetry, the financial markets operate inefficiently. 
Problems related to information may be mitigated by a number of actions, such 
as the use of collateral or financial commitment by borrowers, by funding part of 
a project themselves (Costa and Blum 2007).Another instrument to mitigate the 
effects of asymmetry pointed out by Freixas and Rochet (1999:29) is monitoring, 
a clear form for improving efficiency regarding information asymmetry, with the 
ex-ante use of sorting. 
Costa and Blum (2007) point out that one of the forms for reducing problems with 
information is the use of a borrower’s reputation, built by means of a positive 
performance background in situations during and prior to a loan. However, 
Leland and Pyle (1977) propose that there may be organizations that compile and 
sell information on particular assets classes, as this information may benefit 
other potential lenders. 
Freixas and Rochet (1999:246) assert finally that one of the main forms of 
reducing information asymmetry, and as a result reducing bank risks, could be 
achieved by reducing the cost of information and by increasing its quality. To this 
end, banks in some markets may agree to share information, compiling 
information on individuals. There are institutions in this process known as “credit 
bureaus” in the United States and Canada, “credit reference agencies” in the 
United Kingdom and Australia, and “credit registration centers” in Belgium and 
France. For this paper’s purpose, the term credit bureau will be employed 
regardless of the country under consideration. 
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This paper focuses on the quality of information available and shared in the 
markets, as a proxy of the level of information asymmetry in the credit market. 
Greater details will be provided below from the studies that assessed the impacts 
of the shared use of credit information and its effects in the market. 
 
Sharing credit information and the financial market 
As previously defined, this paper will employ the term credit bureau to describe 
institutions that work with sharing information in a certain market. In general 
these institutions operate basically in three key activities. The first attempts to 
develop an information gathering chain based on the development of channels 
whereby institutions that have a relationship with the market’s credit users will 
inform data in connection with contractual interactions regarding credit 
procedures in a constant manner, and as far as possible, as automated as 
possible. 
A credit bureau’s second function is to store data, organizing them in the form of 
information that makes up a credit background profile of consumers. In 
conclusion, the most important activity is the disclosure of information on 
consumers, on demand, to support the analysis procedures for new loan 
agreements to be provided by the lending institutions active in the market, hence 
increasing information asymmetry on borrowers. Subsequently several academic 
definitions of these institutions will be detailed. 
Pagano and Japelli (1993) define Credit Bureaus as those institutions that gather, 
file, and disclose information voluntarily provided by associates, operating under 
a reciprocal principle: lenders that do not supply data may not access the 
bureau’s files. 
Freixas and Rochet (1999:147) add that association to a credit bureau allows 
banks to access more information on potential borrowers, in exchange for a 
lender’s private information on the behavior of its current customers. Djankov, 
McLiesh and Shleifer (2006) add that these institutions gather credit background 
and current liabilities by borrowers, and share these with lenders. Galindo and 
Miller (2001) also point out that these institutions generally analyze information 
and supply the results of credit scoring to participants. 
Chu (2002) asserts that a credit bureau’s main role is to attenuate problems in 
connection with information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers in loan 
transactions, decreasing the likelihood of moral hazard, adverse selection, and 
excessive indebtedness. The author contends that a credit bureau provides a 
more accurate estimate of a loan’s payment possibilities, based on the 
borrower’s nature. 
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Furthermore, Miller (2000) asserts that once there is a loan transaction, the 
borrower is aware that its performance will be reported to a credit bureau. 
Hence, this information is converted into “reputation collateral”, as any delay in 
payments or default by the borrower will reduce this “collateral’s” value, which 
may jeopardize future loans. Hence, borrowers are encouraged to pay their loans 
in time. 
Galindo and Miller (2001) point out the fact that credit bureaus have become 
more important in the last 20 years, in developed countries as well as in those 
under development, owing to changes in banking systems (arising from merger 
and acquisition processes and the need by a number of institutions to 
concentrate their credit procedures), and technological advance. Miller (2000) 
adds that macroeconomic forces, either positive (stabilization of volatile 
economies) or negative (economic crises), have encouraged the development of 
credit reports. The banks value this kind of institution, as well as central banks 
which in addition to the objectives of improving credit granting processes employ 
the same information for the purposes of bank supervision. 
Pagano and Jappelli (1993) developed the first strict treatment of mechanisms for 
information sharing, and proposed their importance owing to the increase the 
degree of competitiveness in the credit market, raising credit allocation efficiency 
and the volume of loans. The authors surveyed and grouped a sample of 14 
countries. The authors concluded that information sharing decreases default, 
reduces interest rates, and encourages the expansion of credit in the market. 
Galindo and Miller (2001) tested the impacts of credit information in the ability of 
companies of gaining access to credit. They employed data from companies in 20 
countries, creating a number of credit market performance measurements. The 
authors contend that credit bureaus contribute to a more effective financial 
intermediation, evidenced by the increase in the supply of credit. They explain 
that the average equity/indebtedness ratio by companies in the countries is 
positively correlated with the quality of their credit bureaus, and that from the 
viewpoint of companies, the better the existing credit quality the lower would 
credit restrictions be. 
Jappelli and Pagano (2000) prepared a review of the economic effects of 
information sharing, reviewing theory and several sparse empirical studies. The 
authors initially asserted that the key objective would be to reduce adverse 
selection. As a result, bank spreads would be decreased by institutions, as there 
would be greater competition for loans with the increased encouragement for 
borrowers to pay. 
In addition, other effects were detected, such as increased discipline by 
borrowers due to reputation effect. The authors detected a drop in borrowers’ 
over- indebtedness, as the practice of obtaining loans from several financial 
institutions at the same time would be reduced when there is information sharing 
among financial institutions. 
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Gelos (2006) describes the determining factors in bank spreads, using a cross-
section of 85 countries. Among the factors that can be found in the literature as 
determinants for spreads the author argues that a greater availability of 
information on potential borrowers would reduce the risk of default and therefore 
of bank spreads. The results found by this author evidence that there is a 
moderate negative correlation between the availability of information on 
companies in the country and spread levels. 
 
Bank spread determining factors 
One of the key determinants for price in the financial market spreads is the level 
of information asymmetry of the market. The level of information sharing is 
employed as a proxy in this study. Nonetheless, there are also other macro and 
microeconomic variables with a substantial impact on bank spreads. 
In recent years a large number of empirical studies have been developed with 
the purpose of explaining the determining dynamics in loan pricing and bank 
spreads. Ho and Saunders (1981) were one of first studies in the empirical 
literature. Some of the studies in this line of research are Angbazo (1997), 
Saunders and Schumacher (2000), Maudos and Guevara (2004), Barajas et al. 
(1998) who aims to explain Colombian market data.  Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 
(1999) is a World Bank study which lists 11 macro and microeconomic factors 
determinants of spreads. Gelos (2006) analyses the determinants factors on bank 
spreads in Latin America. 
Saunders and Schumacher (2000) use a sample of 746 banks in seven countries 
(United States, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland) 
during the 1988-1995 period. They have obtained the results that among 
microeconomic variables, the greatest impact on bank spreads comes from the 
fiscal and regulatory component, consisting in the implicit payment of interest 
(with the need by banks to increase their margins in the majority of countries) 
and in equity capital requirements. Among the macro-economic variables, 
interest rate volatility and market structure have a positive and statistically 
significant impact on bank spreads, albeit the heterogeneous effects among 
countries. 
Another model for detecting bank spread determining factors in countries was 
prepared by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999). The authors assessed bank 
spread determining factors by means of disconnected banking statistics involving 
7,900 commercial banks in 80 countries from 1998 to 1995. With regard to 
macro-economic variables, it was found that the inflation rate has a positive yet 
statistically insignificant impact on bank spreads, and that the short-term real 
interest rate has a positive and statistically significant effect on bank spreads, yet 
lower in developed countries than in developing countries. These authors note 
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that the real GDP’s growth rate and that of per capita GDP do not appear at the 
world level to have any statistically significant impact on spreads. 
Another study employing panel data to study the bank spread determinants in 
Latin American countries was prepared by Brock and Rojas-Suárez (2000). The 
authors used a sample of banks in six Latin American countries (Argentina, 
Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, México, and Peru) from 1992 to 1996. The main 
conclusion by the authors was that the macroeconomic variables have a different 
impact according for each country. The interest rate volatility has a positive and 
strong impact on bank spreads in Chile and Bolivia. Inflation rates increases 
spreads in Colombia, Chile, and Peru. The real GDP’s growth rate had a negative 
impact on spreads in Chile and Argentina. 
Afanasieff, Lhacer, and Nakane (2001) uses panel data techniques for 142 
commercial banks from February 1997 to November 2000. The authors 
concluded that increases in the base rate, risk premium, GDP growth, and taxes 
have a significant impact on spreads. On the other hand, the inflation rate affect 
spreads adversely. 
Bignotto and Rodrigues (2005) employed a theoretical model proposed by Ho and 
Saunders (1981) for a sample of Brazilian banks from 2001 to 2004. The authors 
found that credit and interest rate risks and administrative costs have greater 
positive impacts on spreads as do the level of bank liquidity, market share, and 
revenues from banking services. 
Laeven and Majnoni (2003) investigated the effects of legal efficiency on bank 
spreads, surveying and grouping data encompassing 106 countries and individual 
bank data for 32 countries, for the year 2000. The authors employed variable 
controls such as inflation and the number regulatory characteristics on banks. 
The study includes an indicator of the degree in which credit information would 
be publicly available. Their results suggest that legal efficiency, in addition to 
inflation, seemed to be the key determinants for the level of interest rate 
spreads. Moreover, the authors found that the existence of credit bureaus, 
among other variables, did not seem to have significant effects on bank spreads. 
Some studies pointed out the availability of credit information on borrowers as a 
determining factor for spreads. Gelos (2006) considers that accessibility by 
financial institutions to information on likely lenders reduces the risk of default, 
therefore reducing spreads. Chu and Schechtman (2003) states that it is 
important for financial institutions to have elements in order to assess whether 
customers will in fact be good payers at a correct price. 
Nakane and Costa (2005) describe a number of common errors in less careful 
studies on the subject, related to the definition of spreads and their 
measurement. The problem is found in the set of loan transactions being 
employed as a basis for their calculation. There are several types of loans such as 
qualitative credit at subsidized rates, in addition to freely priced credits, with 
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large differences between the spreads for each one of these. Hence, the interest 
rate used in the comparison should be defined in order to preserve a conceptual 
consistency. 
In addition, risk ratings should be considered. Some countries may report a 
market average from the low and high risks operations. In the specific case of IMF 
database it is possible to access what type of rates is reported for a number of 
countries available in this datasets. 
 
Econometric methodology and results 
In this study it is discussed whether or not there is a relationship between the 
existence and the quality of a country’s credit information on bank spreads. 
Hence, bank spreads and their determining factors, including the quality of 
shared information in the market, are quantified by employing specific indicators. 
Panel techniques are used as a base for the analysis. 
 
Sample 
In this paper, the number of countries with prime rate data information recorded 
in the IMF and World Bank databases for the years under study will define the 
sample’s maximum size. In order to a avoid problems in international 
comparisons a detailed assessment is required to define and measure loan rates 
recorded in the IMF database. Each country data has an explanatory note that 
contains a brief description of the nature and characteristics of the rate reported 
(IFS 2002:xx-xxi). 
Hence, based on a universe of 196 countries with a total of 980 notes, a sample 
was selected containing 14 countries with valid data, with recorded loan rates 
intended for a lower-risk public (prime rates) with 70 notes from 2002 to 2006. 
Though the data on spreads are available for periods prior to 2002, they cannot 
be employed as the information asymmetry indicators were prepared based on 
the World Bank’s Doing Business not available for the period prior to 2002. 
 
Description of the variables employed 
This study will deal with the associations between a dependent variable a 
country’s average bank spread, selected to measure the cost of bank loans in the 
credit market, and independent variables, all of which assessed under a macro 
perspective and grouped by countries, representing the quality and scope of 
information sharing in the market, as follows: (i) Credit Information Rate, which 
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measures rules regarding scope, access, and quality of credit information; (ii) 
Degree of Coverage of the population of public credit bureaus; and (iii) Degree of 
Coverage of the population of private credit bureaus. The following control 
variables were also employed: (i) the Country’s Tax Burden; (ii) Equity Capital 
Requirements; (iii) Inflation; (iv) Default Level; and (v) Quality of the legal 
system. 
 
Statistical models 
There are two basic models employed in panel analysis fixed effects and random 
effects. The fixed effects approach considers that individual effects are a 
constant specific term and constant in time at an individual’s level. 
The basic equation for this model is: 
 
Equation 1 
 
 	 			   
 
 
Where α is a fixed component connected to the unit  which represents the 
several unknown intercepts under estimation, one intercept per country. 
The random effects model is: 
 
Equation 2 
 
 		 			 		 		 
 
 
Where µ

 represents the random shock describing the th note and is constant 
throughout the time (Greene 2000:560, Jonhston, Jack and Dinardo 2001:424). 
 
Survey results 
The models selected for this study are: pooled OLS (ordinary least square), fixed 
effects models FD (first differences), and LSDV (least square dummies variables), 
and random effects models GLS (generalized least square). 
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Table 1. Results of the estimates for the equation (XX) by OLS, FD, LSDV, and GLS. 
OLS a FD a 
LnSP_Deposit Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob  Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob  
D1 0.000000     0.000000     
D2 -0.004407 0.009960 -0.442 0.660  0.001121 0.002433 0.460 0.648  
D3 -0.024790 0.016850 -1.470 0.147  -0.007141 0.005214 -1.370 0.179  
D4 -0.026388 0.013050 -2.020 0.048 ** -0.009586 0.007066 -1.360 0.183  
D5 -0.041211 0.012490 -3.300 0.002 *** -0.012298 0.008028 -1.530 0.134  
D6 -0.045401 0.009149 -4.960 0.000 *** -0.019407 0.009775 -1.990 0.054 * 
PPRV 0.000200 0.000459 0.435 0.665  0.000074 0.000595 0.125 0.901  
PPRV2 0.000005 0.000011 0.486 0.629  0.000008 0.000014 0.575 0.568  
PPRV3 0.000000 0.000000 -1.320 0.192  0.000000 0.000000 -1.320 0.193  
CAPIT 0.000229 0.000859 0.266 0.791  0.000970 0.000911 1.060 0.294  
INFPIB 0.000864 0.000798 1.080 0.284  0.000450 0.000553 0.813 0.422  
IMPLU1 0.000808 0.000396 2.040 0.046 ** 0.001660 0.000558 2.970 0.005 *** 
IMPLU2 0.000428 0.000216 1.980 0.052 * -0.001518 0.000551 -2.760 0.009 *** 
INAD 0.001548 0.000535 2.890 0.006 *** 0.001443 0.000624 2.310 0.026 ** 
PROPMIN -0.052563 0.008748 -6.010 0.000 *** -0.015727 0.010930 -1.440 0.158  
PROPMED -0.029289 0.006412 -4.570 0.000 *** 0.000000     
PROPMAX -0.046159 0.009130 -5.060 0.000 *** 0.000000     
Constant 0.055313 0.017750 3.120 0.003 *** -0.000546 0.000875 -0.624 0.536  
           
R2 0.8980923    R2 0.4764915   
no. of observations 70 
no. of parameters 18 
no. of observations 56 
no. of parameters 18 
number of individuals 14    number of individuals 14   
longest time series 5 [1 - 5]    longest time series 4 [2 - 5]   
shortest time series 5 (balanced panel)   shortest time series 4 (balanced panel) 
Specification tests      
Wald (joint): Chi^2(17) =1.580e+005 [0.000] **  Wald (joint): Chi^2(17) =1.191e+005 [0.000] ** 
Wald (dummy): Chi^2(1) = 9.713 [0.002] **  Wald (dummy): Chi^2(1) = 0.3893 [0.533] 
AR(1) test: N(0,1) = 2.229 [0.026] *   AR(1) test: N(0,1) = 1.073 [0.283] 
AR(2) test: N(0,1) = -0.6681 [0.504]   AR(2) test: N(0,1) = -1.656 [0.098] 
   Continues 
LSDV a 1 GLS a 
LnSP_Deposit Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob  Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob  
D1 0.000000     0,000000     
D2 0.012713 0.002231 5.700 0.000 *** -0.002659 0.012080 -0.220 0.827  
D3 0.002431 0.005068 0.480 0.634  -0.022806 0.010530 -2.170 0.035 ** 
D4 -0.000634 0.006706 -0.095 0.925  -0.024685 0.008367 -2.950 0.005 *** 
D5 -0.005093 0.007601 -0.670 0.507  -0.038550 0.009766 -3.950 0.000 *** 
D6 -0.017139 0.008869 -1.930 0.061 * -0.042758 0.009346 -4.580 0.000 *** 
PPRV 0.000102 0.000719 0.142 0.888  0.000132 0.000465 0.285 0.777  
PPRV2 0.000011 0.000017 0.656 0.516  0.000007 0.000012 0.595 0.554  
PPRV3 0.000000 0.000000 -1.620 0.113  0.000000 0.000000 -1.400 0.168  
CAPIT 0.000138 0.001191 0.116 0.908  0.000306 0.000592 0.517 0.607  
INFPIB 0.000318 0.000568 0.561 0.578  0.000852 0.000399 2.140 0.037 ** 
IMPLU1 0.002073 0.000928 2.240 0.031 ** 0.000734 0.000398 1.850 0.071 * 
IMPLU2 -0.002058 0.001040 -1.980 0.055 * 0.000455 0.000256 1.780 0.081 * 
INAD 0.001212 0.000493 2.460 0.019 ** 0.001498 0.000398 3.770 0.000 *** 
PROPMIN -0.044587 0.021580 -2.070 0.046 ** -0.051620 0.007726 -6.680 0.000 *** 
PROPMED -0.028911 0.016600 -1.740 0.089 * -0.029657 0.007801 -3.800 0.000 *** 
PROPMAX -0.030783 0.023370 -1.320 0.195  -0.045461 0.008129 -5.590 0.000 *** 
Constant 0.095364 0.019440 4.910 0.000 *** 0.054336 0.013120 4.140 0.000 *** 
           
R2 0.9653761    R2 0.8833998   
no. of observations 70 
no. of parameters 31 
no. of observations 70 
no. of parameters 18 
number of individuals 14    number of individuals 14   
longest time series 5 [1 - 5]    longest time series 5 [1 - 5]   
shortest time series 5 (balanced panel)   shortest time series 5 (balanced panel) 
Specification tests      
Wald (joint): Chi^2(17) = 5807. [0.000] **  Wald (joint): Chi^2(17) = 266.5 [0.000] ** 
Wald (dummy): Chi^2(14) =1.053e+004 [0.000] **  Wald (dummy): Chi^2(1) = 17.14 [0.000] ** 
AR(1) test: N(0,1) = -1.487 [0.137]   AR(1) test: N(0,1) = 2.582 [0.010] ** 
AR(2) test: N(0,1) = -2.626 [0.009] **   AR(2) test: N(0,1) = -0.4773 [0.633] 
a Temporal dummies were not included as they are not significant. 
1 Contain dummies of individuals. 
Source: prepared by the authors. 
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The effect of sharing information as compared on the dependent variable 
LN_SP_Deposit (bank spread considering the opportunity cost at a deposit's 
average rate) can be seen in Table 1, which consolidates the results. 
The choice of the technique employed will depend on the assumptions regarding 
the existence of correlation between random errors () and regressors (), and 
regarding random errors and fixed effects () in order to obtain consistent 
estimators and with the desired efficiency properties. All parameters standard 
deviations were calculate using robust to heterocedasticity and autocorrelation 
matrix. 
The parameter estimates obtained by OLS and of those obtained for the fixed 
effects models (FD and LSDV) differ and this indicate that the assumption of the 
fixed effect is not orthogonal to the regressors. In this case the estimates 
obtained by OLS would be biased. An analysis of the specification tests did not 
give evidence in favor of necessity of dynamic models. We opt not to estimate 
dynamic panel data models. 
The Hausman test was performed in order to assess which model would be 
preferable: Fixed Effect (LSDV) and Random Effect (GLS). Under the null 
hyptohesis, the Fixed Effect as well as the Random Effects models gives 
consistent parameters estimators, and the latter proved to be more efficient. 
Under the alternative hypothesis, the Random Effects model provides an 
inconsistent parameter estimate, and hence the difference between both 
estimators should be different from zero in the alternative hypothesis and equal 
to zero in the null hypothesis. 
 
Table 2. Hausman Test LSDV and GLS. 
Hausman test 
 Dif. Coef ^2 Var (LSDV) Var GLS Var(LSDV)-Var(GLS) Chi^2 (1)  
D2 0.000236 0.000084 0.000146 -0.0000622 -3.798  
D3 0.000637 0.000114 0.000111 0.0000034 187.597  
D4 0.000578 0.000129 0.000070 0.0000593 9.759  
D5 0.001119 0.000184 0.000095 0.0000885 12.649  
D6 0.000656 0.000291 0.000087 0.0002040 3.217  
PPRV 0.000000 0.000001 0.000000 0.0000004 0.003 ** 
PPRV2 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.0000000 0.110 ** 
PPRV3 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.0000000 1.033 ** 
Source: Prepared by the author using regressions without robust errors. 
 
It can be seen in Table 2, that probably the assumption of regressors are 
orthogonal to the fixed effects should not be a valid for the information sharing 
variables (D1 to D6). The Hausman statistics is significant at standard levels. The 
only regressors for which Hausman’s statistics are not significant were the 
coverage degrees by the Private Bureaus. In the case of the D2 variable, a 
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negative Hausman statistics was found, a possible fact by virtue of the difference 
between the variances in both models are not necessarily always positive. 
In general, estimated parameters display the signs expected by theory. With 
regard to the control variables, the larger part of the coefficients appeared 
statistically significant. The IMPLU1 variable suggests that countries with a higher 
tax burden on income have greater bank spreads. Furthermore, the IMPLU2 
Variable suggests that a country’s improved tax composition to the benefit of 
direct taxation (less distortional) is associated with a reduction in bank spreads. 
Similarly, a variable INAD controls the impact of default on spreads. On the other 
hand, the variables which represent the legal system’s quality confirm the results 
obtained by Laeven and Mdjouri (2003), suggesting that a legal system more 
severe with borrowers results in lower bank spreads. The remaining explanatory 
variables, INFPIB, the country’s inflation rate, CAPIT, the market capitalization 
structure, show the expected results. 
A preliminary comment on results has to do with the D2 variable, which despite 
recording in the LSDV model a positive and statistically significant coefficient, 
which would be counter-intuitive, i.e., spreads would rise with the increased 
quality of information sharing. An assessment of the database leads to the 
explanation for this result, which arises from the fact that there is only one 
country rated as D2. Therefore the result should not be considered. 
The coefficients D4 to D6 (which point to levels 4, 5, or 6 in the World Bank’s 
INDINF) are negative in all the econometric methods. However, only those 
parameters associated to the 6 quality indicator (under which the country is 
deemed to meet all the quality assessment criteria for shared information), has 
proved to be expressive in all the models, while the D3 to D5 variables are 
expressive and with the sign expected only for the GLS model. 
The results obtained here suggest the existence of a negative relation between 
the level of information sharing in a certain country, and the level of bank 
spreads (for prime rate customers). In accordance with the results found, ceteris 
paribus, countries with a high level of credit information sharing have a spread 
roughly 2% below that in other countries (bearing in mind the fixed effect 
model’s coefficient, a preferable specification), and as low as 4% (random effect 
model, specification which is not a good model from statistical tests). 
 
Conclusions 
The main result of this paper is that the existence of a lesser degree of 
information asymmetry in credit markets can reduce bank spreads. This 
conclusion was obtained based on prime rates debts data analysis from IMF data. 
The estimated effect varies from 2% to 4% permanent reduction in spreads. It is 
conjectured that greater reductions could be obtained for other kinds of risk 
 128 
Barbosa & Marçal. RGPP. 2011, 1(2):113-130. 
credits and not just for lower risk customers. The relationship obtained seems to 
be robust in statistical terms. Nonetheless, new studies involving longer samples 
data should be performed in order to confirm this relation as they become 
available in the Doing Business World Bank publication. 
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